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11. Introduction
During the last decades the capitalization of stock markets has increased
tremendously in almost all OECD countries. For a group of 19 OECD countries the
average of stock market capitalization relative to Gross Domestic Product increased
from 0.18 in 1976 to 0.61 in 1996. This is an important development because well
functioning stock markets can play a crucial  role in an economy (see e.g. Rousseau
and Wachtel, 2000). These markets provide investors with a possible exit mechanism
and give them the opportunity to transfer surpluses from short-term assets to long-
term capital markets, where the funds can be used for investments by firms.
Moreover, the existence of stock markets provides important information that
improves the efficiency of financial intermediation. Based upon this reasoning some
are of the opinion that the character of the financial system of the industrialized
countries will converge towards that of the Anglo-Saxon countries, where stock
market capitalization is historically high (see, e.g. Schaberg, 1999, esp. pp. 111-113
for some references).
However, although the capitalization of stock markets has increased in all
countries concerned, the differences between the countries have increased; the
standard deviation of cross-country levels of stock market capitalization increased
from 0.21 in 1986 to 0.37 in 1996. Moreover most countries did not change position
when ranked according to the level of stock market capitalization (as a percentage of
GDP): the correlation between the figures for 1986 and those of 1996 is 0.92. This
suggests that the pattern of cross-country differences in importance of stock markets
is very persistent. Another argument against the convergence hypothesis is that one
should be cautious against taking for granted that financial development is
unidirectional, and that the current generalized consensus in favor of free markets,
because of their obvious efficiency, is irreversible (Rajan and Zingales, 2000, p. 47).
Stock markets lead to a greater short-term instability, fail to provide insurance to
people and firms against large changes - such as long-term economic downturn and
decay of entire industries - and hinder the functioning of institutions which provide
such insurance (Rajan and Zingales, 2000, p. 19). Political and economic agents may
view these as significant disadvantages, which are great enough to outweigh the
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2advantages brought by stock market development. Moreover, differences in financial
organization between advanced countries have been very persistent over the last
century, during which performance first diverged and then converged (Carlin and
Mayer, 1999, p. 2). This raises the question of which factors can explain these
differences in financial systems, in particular the differences in importance of stock
markets.
Essentially three approaches can be distinguished for explaining cross-
country differences in financial systems: the legal approach, the political approach
and the cultural view. The legal approach is brought forward by La Porta and his co-
authors (La Porta et al., 1997, 1998, 2000). This approach holds that the key
precondition for the development of equity markets is the protection of outside
investors through the legal system, including both suitable regulatory provisions and
the quality of their enforcement (La Porta et al., 1997). If the legal protection is good,
the investments in equity will increase. The authors construct indicators of minority-
shareholder rights protection and show that stock market development is significantly
related to these indicators. La Porta and colleagues further show that countries with a
Common Law origin protect investors better and are therefore more friendly to the
development of financial markets. It is not quite clear, however, why this is the case.
One reason could be that Common Law leaves more room for judges to adapt their
decisions to changes in the economy, while in Civil Law countries judges have no
flexibility for interpreting the law.  Many researchers, however, argue that this is too
weak an explanation (Berglöf and Von Thadden, 1999; Roe, 2000). Berglöf and Von
Thadden point out that another interpretation is possible. The correlation between
legal origin and financing arrangements may merely reflect the influence of a third
exogenous variable. As candidates they suggest the role of the state or the nature of
the political system.
The political approach is found in Pagano and Volpin (1999) and Rajan and
Zingales (2000). The latter claims that political structures explain the cross-country
differences in stock market developments. Rajan and Zingales argue that shifts in
political coalitions determine shifts in the character of financial development. In
particular, they argue that markets and the resulting competition do not respect the
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3value of incumbency and can destroy some forms of insurance provided by social and
economic institutions. When political groups especially affected by this become
strong, the political system might suppress the development of markets.
Disadvantages of their study are that they do not explain systematically why this
suppression differs so much across countries and that they use different arguments for
explaining developments in different countries: political and cultural factors for the
USA and economic arguments for the UK. Pagano and Volpin (1999) model the
interaction between entrepreneurs, rentiers, and workers when these three groups
have to agree upon the degree of investor protection and the employers’ freedom to
fire worker. They show that depending on the strength of the workers’ preference for
working with the same employer, this political process leads to a low level or a high
level of protection of investors. The two corresponding equilibria are labeled the
corporatist and the noncorporatist equilibrium, respectively. An advantage of that
paper is that it relates the extent of investor protection to other aspects of the
economy, in particular the employers’ freedom to fire employees. It does not,
however, explain why one country ends in the corporatist equilibrium and the other in
the noncorporatist one. Cultural characteristics could help in this respect.
The cultural approach argues that cross-country differences can be explained
by differences between national cultures, defined as systems of beliefs that shape
individuals’ actions. Studies belonging to this group are Licht et al. (2001), Stulz and
Williamson (2001) and Semenov (2000). The study of Stulz and Williamson has an
exploratory character. It investigates whether there exists a relationship between
characteristics of governance systems and cultural dimensions. It does not provide a
preliminary theoretical analysis that would suggest through which mechanisms and in
which direction such a relationship is expected. In that study  culture is approximated
by the dominant religion and the dominant language in a country. These variables are
dichotomous. This can be too rough. For example, in the Netherlands the number of
Roman-Catholics does not differ much from the number of protestants, so that
including the Netherlands in any of the two categories has a highly arbitrary
character. Finally, Stulz and Williamson find evidence for a relation between religion
and language and creditor rights but cannot find such a relationship for shareholder
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4rights. Can this finding be explained substantively or is it due to an incomplete
representation of culture? Hence, although we share the view of Stulz and Williamson
that culture shapes economic behavior, we suggest that the empirically analyzed
relations between cultural and economic variables should be derived by means of a
theoretical investigation and that in the empirical analysis a continuous scale is
preferred to a dichotomous one. Licht et al. (2001) use cultural variables which are of
continuous scale. However, as Stulz and Williamson (2001) they restrict themselves
to the correlation between cultural dimensions and indices of regulation and
enforcement of regulation. The hypotheses are derived intuitively and are not based
on any theory of the functioning of financial markets.
In this paper we present an analysis that remedies the two main disadvantages
of  previous studies. On the basis of existing theoretical and empirical literature we
theoretically derive the factors most relevant for the development of stock markets,
and formulate hypotheses about the relation between these factors and cultural
characteristics. Thereafter, in the empirical tests we use cultural variables which are
measured on a continuous scale. This analysis has the advantage that the empirically
observed relationships of cultural and economic variables may be given a clear
interpretation. Moreover, in contrast to the previous studies we analyze all relevant
factors influencing stock market development, rather than a subset of them such as
some regulation issues.
The setup of the paper is as follows. The next section contains a framework
for explaining cross-country differences in financial systems and describes relevant
characteristics and mechanisms. In Section 3 hypotheses are formulated on the
relationship between these mechanisms and the cultural dimensions found by
Hofstede (1980). These hypotheses are tested empirically for 19 OECD countries in
Section 4. Section 5 deals with the stability of the cultural variables, compares our
procedure with the other approaches to explaining cross-country differences in
financial systems, and discusses the perspective of this study on the convergence of
financial systems. Concluding remarks are presented in Section 6.
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52 Explaining differences in national financial systems
2.1 A framework
Central in this paper is the idea that culture, economic institutions, economic
organization and economic performance are interrelated. By culture we understand
”shared cognition, values, norms, and expressive symbols” (DiMaggio, 1994, p. 25).
This “collective programming of mind… distinguishes the members of one human
group from another” (Hofstede, 1980, p. 21). Following North, we define institutions
as ''the rules of the game in society or, more formally,… the humanly devised
constraints that shape human interaction. In consequence they structure incentives in
human exchange, whether political, social, or economic'' (North, 1990, p.3).
Institutions constitute a framework within which human interaction takes place. They
can be divided in formal institutions, such as written rules and legislation, and
informal institutions: unwritten codes of conduct that underlie and supplement formal
rules. The economic organization is the complex process by which agents interact
with each other. The distinction between institutions and organizations is comparable
to that between the rules of the game and the game as it is played by the players.
Although we are aware of the fact that there is a two-way causation between
culture, institutions, organizations and economic performance, in this paper we focus
on the impact of culture on the other factors. Culture influences the preferences of
economic agents. These preferences shape the behavior of the agents and hence the
organization and the actual performance of an economy.  Cultural differences across
countries therefore will lead to differences between nations with respect to
preferences, economic institutions and organizations. The mental models of investors
and managers of firms influence their choices of the mechanisms of their transactions.
The aggregate of these choices results in a configuration of financial system. The
attractiveness of different mechanisms will depend on the regulatory environment,
which in turn will be influenced by the preferences of political agents.
Hence, in order to understand how culture influences stock market
development, we have to find out which preferences are relevant for this process, and
how these preferences are influenced by cultural norms. We can thus ascertain
whether particular combinations of cultural characteristics are more conductive to the
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6development of stock markets. We do not investigate all factors influencing stock
market performance but concentrate on those which are relevant for explaining
differences in their size across countries.
The capitalization of the stock market is determined as the equilibrium of
demand and supply of equity. The demand curve will be determined by the amount of
capital available for investments and the attractiveness of investing in shares in
comparison to investing in other financial instruments such as bonds, deposits, and
property. The supply curve is determined by the attractiveness of issuing shares for
managers/owners. Cross-country differences with respect to the attractiveness of
shares as investments or as financing instruments are determined by cross-country
differences in preferences of investors respectively managers/owners and in the
regulatory environment.
2.2 The demand for shares
2.2.1 The volume of money available
The amount of private money available for investment depends on the financial
endowments of the population. This endowment is determined by the size of the
country and the prosperity of its inhabitants. Since no data are available about the
financial wealth of countries, in the empirical analysis we will use GDP as a scaling
variable for correcting for cross-country differences in size and GDP per capita for
approximating the wealth per capita.
Capital invested in shares comes from individual and institutional investors.
In countries where the institutional investors are less developed less capital will be
available for purchase of shares. Therefore, for a given supply the price investors will
be prepared to pay will be lower. In particular, if the state plays a significant role in
provision of pensions, this will hinder the development of pension funds which are
major institutional investors.1 The factors relevant for cross-country difference in the
state’s role in the provision of pensions is discussed in section 2.4.2.
                                               
1 A study by Röell (1996) finds a statistically significant (at the 5% level) negative
relationship between the proportion of GDP devoted to public pensions and the size of the stock
market. This indicates that the state’s greater involvement in the provision of pensions may be
crowding out private pension funds and consequently reduces the supply of risk-bearing money.
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72.2.2 The attractiveness of investments in equity
Given the amount of capital available for investments, the decision to invest in shares
will depend on the attractiveness for the investors of shares compared to other
investment opportunities, such as bonds, deposits and property. We follow the
literature in assuming that the utility of investors is determined by the return and risk
characteristics of the investment. We assume that people are uncertainty averse, that
is they tend to prefer the choices (lotteries, investments, etc.) about the risks of which
they know more to those about the risks of which they know less. This assumption is
validated by empirical evidence and has recently been incorporated in the theoretical
literature (see e.g. Bewley, 1986; Gilboa, 1987; Gilboa and Schmeidler, 1989;
Schmeidler, 1989).
Investments in equity are more uncertain than those in alternative assets such
as bonds and deposits. The attractiveness of investing in shares compared to the other
assets will thus depend on the attitude of investors towards uncertainty. More
uncertainty averse investors will be prepared to pay less for a share of a given firm.
Investors in different countries may differ in the degree of their uncertainty aversion.
Regulatory environment will also significantly influence the attractiveness of
investing in shares.
Since the fluctuations in share prices are high, investors want to know the
direction in which these prices are likely to move. In order to be able to make such an
assessment, they need information on the prospects of the firm. Regular reports on the
performance of the firm can provide this information. Moreover investors want to be
informed at any moment about important changes in the strategy of the firm.
Relatively detailed information about the company’s performance is also needed in
order to give the investors the possibility to investigate whether the management uses
the money provided for the benefit of the firm. When mandatory disclosure rules are
more lax, to the extent this influences actual disclosure, the investors will have less
information about the firm, and investment in equity will thus be less attractive.
For relatively small investors, the attractiveness of investing in shares will
depend on the relative position the investors acquire against corporate insiders
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8(managers and large shareholders that have close ties with the management). Shares
give the holders the right to vote on the important decisions related to the company, in
particular on the membership of the board of directors, to raise the issues to be
discussed at a shareholders’ meeting, and to start the legal proceedings against
directors that breach their duties to shareholders. Without these rights, investors
would not be able to extract from corporate insiders the return to their investment.
The legislation in different countries, however, may be much more conductive to
exercising these rights than in other countries. Furthermore, the corporate insiders are
able to obtain important information about the prospects of the firm before any other
investor, and can exploit this inside information by buying or selling shares.
Regulatory treatment of insider trading may differ across countries. Another
disadvantage for small shareholders might be that major investors might trade shares
against better terms than are available for small investors. For example, an investor
can acquire a majority of the shares and thus control of the firm by offering one or
two major shareholders a price that is significantly higher than the current market
price, without being forced to buy all shares. The small shareholders are never in the
position to earn a higher price than the price listed at the stock market. How the
regulations treat such kind of transactions may vary across countries.
Finally, the advantages of buying and holding securities for investors will
depend on the level of taxation on the transfer of securities.
Concluding, we expect that demand for shares will be higher in countries
where the inhabitants have a lower aversion towards uncertainty, and where the
regulatory environment makes investment in shares more attractive.
2.3 The supply of equity
The supply curve of shares will be determined by the costs and benefits involved in
issuing shares. Issuing public stock incurs significant direct and indirect costs. The
direct costs involve the costs of flotation (up to 10 percent of the value of equity) and
taxation of security issues. There are also direct opportunity costs related to under-
pricing of initial public offerings. The indirect costs for managers are the result of the
increased necessity to publish the achievements and intentions of the company for the
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9future. This increased disclosure bears the risk of informing competitors and might
also lead to more pressure for wage increases from employees and pressure to pay
dividends (Roëll, 1996).
Notwithstanding these costs there are benefits for managers/owners of going
public. Roëll (1996), on the basis of theoretical analysis and a survey of opinions of
managers in the USA and some European countries, has identified the following main
benefits: cashing in by the initial owner; reducing the level of debt of the firm with
proceedings obtained through the public offering; enhanced company image and
publicity; benefits resulting for owners/managers from the use of information
contained in a share price by (present and future) stakeholders. The first two factors
can be consolidated into one: the level of net monetary benefits from issuing shares.
This level is the difference of gross benefits and costs. The level of gross benefits, of
course, does not influence the supply curve (which indicates how much shares are on
offer for any given level of gross benefits). The level of costs, on the other hand,
influences this curve. While costs of flotation may differ among countries, we are not
aware of any argument that can relate these differences to preferences of agents. The
costs of paying taxes on security issues, on the other hand, may systematically differ
across countries and will be influenced by preferences of politicians.  We are not
aware of theoretical arguments or empirical evidence attesting that the importance of
publicity differs across countries.2 Such differences are likely to exist, however, in
level of the benefits resulting for owners/managers from the use of information
contained in a share price by (present and future) stakeholders.
                                               
2 The type of industry seems to be relevant in this respect. Enhancing public image is
more important for firms producing consumer goods than for those producing basic or intermediate
products. There is some casual evidence in favour of this proposition. A good example is the
difference in attitude between Phillips and AKZO, when both acquired a listing at an American
stock market. Phillips, which has an important division in consumer electronics and electric tubes,
decided to use the New York Stock Exchange, since this would produce more publicity. In addition
the company launched an advertisement campaign entitled “ A New Light on the Blue Board”,
which referred to the electric tubes it sells. At the same time AKZO, a producer of chemical
products that are sold to other factories, decided to acquire a listing at NASDAQ. The costs of
acquiring a listing were lower than for a listing at NYSE and the Board did not regard the
additional publicity associated with a listing at NYSE as of any importance.
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2.3.2. The importance of information derived from share price
Future (equity and non-equity) investors will use the equity price as a source of
information about the company's value. This information reduces their uncertainty
about the company and thus reduces the price for which they are willing to provide
capital. Potential and actual employees will judge by the share price whether their job
is secure, suppliers – how safe it is to provide the firm with trade credit, and
customers – with what probability and for how long the product will be supported (by
honouring warranties, providing spare parts etc.).
The importance for a stakeholder of the share price as a source of information
depends on how close the relationship with the firm is. When it is close, the
stakeholder has less necessity to obtain additional information about the firm from its
share prices. This reduces the benefits of issuing shares for owners/managers.
The attractiveness of each of these relationships will be determined by the
preferences of the managers. From a thorough investigation of twelve large American
corporation Donaldson (1984) derives four motives by which top managers are
driven: the desire for self-fulfillment (according to some specific measures of
personal and organizational achievement), the desire for independence (of
constituencies having control over scarce resources)3, the desire for self-sufficiency of
the firm, and the desire for survival, that is, for “long-term health and vitality of the
organization as an effective and influential corporate presence, with the incumbent
managers fully in charge” (p. 21). These motives induce a sustainable growth of the
firm as an overarching objective of the top managers. The first three motives are
probably quite general for managers across the world. However, Donaldson
emphasizes that the desire for self-sufficiency is largely determined by the perception
of the American financial environment by managers. In a different environment this
motive might be much less strong. Based on this analysis, we assume that managers
pursue two objectives: the objective of independence4 and the objective of sustained
                                               
3 This motive is also suggested, albeit for firms rather than for top managers, by resource
dependence theories originating from the work of Pfeffer and Salancik (1978). In particular, this
motive produces a preference of internal over external sources of finance; this concurs with
‘pecking order’ theory of finance (Myers and Majluf, 1984).
4 The objective of self-fulfillment, although important, is less relevant for our purposes
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survival and growth, which can be divided into two subgoals – growth of the firm and
reduction of uncertainties. The relative importance of these objectives may differ
among societies.
What will determine whether the relationship between a firm and a
stakeholder is arm’s-length or close? Consider the relationship of a firm with a
creditor (a financial institution or a trade creditor). To achieve the same level of utility
the creditor would require larger return and/or larger collateral in arm's-length than in
close relationships, since in the latter case close knowledge of the firms and greater
possibilities of monitoring partially substitutes collateral and other contractual
provisions as a devise of disciplining managers and reducing uncertainty for
investors. This difference in the return and/or collateral required by the creditor will
be larger the more uncertainty averse the creditor is. Thus, the more uncertainty
averse the creditor is, the more likely is the goal of sustained survival to be achieved
under close relationship. Furthermore, for a manager close relationships with
stakeholders involve a greater reduction in independence but also a greater reduction
in uncertainty (debt or terms of trade of a contract are easier to renegotiate; bank or
trade credit at future dates is more readily available). The managers for whom
independence is relatively more important will thus be less inclined to enter in close
relationships, and the managers for whom reduction in uncertainty is relatively more
important will be more inclined to enter such relationships.
To conclude, the supply curve of equity may systematically differ across
countries because of differences in taxation of security issues, and in importance of
share price as a source of information for stakeholders (which, in turn, is related to
differences in importance of certainty and independence for managers, and in
importance of certainty for stakeholders).
2.4 The role of politicians
In the previous subsection we have seen that the regulatory environment of the
financial system crucially influences the costs and benefits of issuing and buying
shares. Moreover, the amount of capital available for investments depends on the
                                                                                                               
than the other objectives.
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extent the pensions are provided by the government. Both the regulation and the way
the provisions of pensions are organized are determined by the decisions of
politicians, who are representing the preferences of the population. In this section we
relate the characteristics of the regulation and the provision of pensions to the
preferences of the politicians.
Following the public choice literature, we assume that politicians care about
the prospects of their re-election. They thus seek to introduce policies that will find
support in the majority of population. Theoretical and empirical work suggests that
the level of well-being and the level of certainty about it are of crucial importance to
individuals’ welfare: people care about their income and are uncertainty- and risk-
averse. Politicians who would like to increase their prospects of re-election would
then take measures in favour of a system which promotes economic efficiency and
which is less apt to bring about and/or aggravate economic instabilities and
fluctuations.5 In addition, normative considerations are used for evaluating  outcomes
and characteristics of economic organizations.
2.4.1. Regulation
As we discussed above, politicians will evaluate financial systems on the basis of
economic efficiency, certainty of income and stability, and normative considerations.
Among those, in regard to financial system the attitude towards concentration of
economic power is especially important, as revealed by the studies on the history of
financial systems, especially that of the United States of America (see Roe, 1991,
1994). Financial and economic (and thus usually political) power may be more or less
acceptable for political agents (and a society as a whole), regardless of its effects on
economic efficiency. For example, it may be held that concentration contradicts the
principle of equality of opportunity when it increases barriers to entry, or that it
contradicts democratic values when it gives powerful agents undue political
influence.
                                               
5 See e.g. the discussion by Allen (1996) of the criteria on which financial systems should
be judged and the description of the history of the financial system in the United States by Rajan
and Zingales (2000) in particular pp. 31 and 32. See also Quinn and Wooley (2001) for the evidence
that voters punish incumbent political parties when volatility of growth increases.
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Hence, financial systems will be evaluated on the basis of economic
efficiency, certainty of income, stability, and concentration of power and wealth.
People in all societies are likely to attach some value to these considerations.
However, in many cases there will be a trade-off among them, at least in the
perception of political agents. Thus, there is often a trade-off between efficiency and
stability (Black, 1987; Altman, 1995; Quinn and Wooley, 2001). It is here where
cultural differences among societies may play a role.
The extent to which equity markets should be allowed (or encouraged) to
develop is a part of a bigger issue: the degree of competition that should exist in the
financial system. Equity (and bond) markets provide firms with a source of external
finance alternative to financial intermediaries, and thus increases competition in the
financial system. Competition goes with an individualistic ethic which is skeptical
about a concentration of power and hence favors a small government (see e.g. CPB,
1997, Chapter 5).
In societies with active stock markets the certainty of people’s consumption is
lower. First, there is a considerable evidence that stock prices are very volatile, more
volatile than changes in fundamentals can account for (e.g. Campbell and Shiller,
1988; West, 1988; Leroy and Parke, 1992). This can cause considerable volatility in
the consumption of investors who liquidate stocks to finance their consumption
(Laffont, 1985). Second, most researchers and practitioners agree that equity markets
are quite prone to instability (Crockett, 1996).6  This increases the uncertainty of
consumption. Third, the fact that firms can be taken over for reasons that have little to
do with their performance, and the employees laid off, increases this uncertainty.
Fourth, most of the risks individuals face about their lifetime well-being are not
insured. Examples are risks of changes in the value of real estate, of changes in the
level of national, regional, or occupational incomes, and of changes in the value of
one’s human capital. There are big practical obstacles for such insurance that make it
unfeasible (Allen and Gale, 2000). Intermediaries can ensure individuals against some
of such risks, in particular the risk of the change in future values of consumption due
                                               
6 Short-term memory of investors, ‘herd behaviour’, delayed reactions to
macroeconomic changes, and some technical features of equity markets are the principal
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to economy-wide shocks (such as oil crises in the early 1970s). However, investors
thus have to be prevented from access to equity markets to sustain such a scheme
(Allen and Gale, 1995).
Increased competition in the financial system thus increases the uncertainty in
consumption. Several authors argue that private credit-creating institutions have an
intrinsic predisposition to undergo periodic waves of crisis and bankruptcy. The
collapse in the condition of these institutions is then transmitted to all spheres of the
economy, producing a general decline. This tendency is exacerbated by competition
in the banking sector, since competition induces taking excessive risks (Allen and
Gale, 2000) and intensifies ‘herd behavior’ (see Crockett, 1996). As mentioned
earlier, many major risks faced by individuals cannot be insured on the market. Many
of them, however, can be and have been insured by communities and through
relationships. Increased competition can is destructive for such forms of insurance,
without creating new ones7 (Polanyi, 1944; Rajan and Zingales, 2000).
The effect of stock markets on economic efficiency is an unsettled issue in
the literature.8 What is important for our analysis is that there is no overwhelming
                                                                                                               
reasons for this.
7 For instance, competition makes it harder for long-term bank-firm relationships to
form, and increases the risks of firms being shut off from credit in the downturn (Mayer, 1988;
Petersen and Rajan, 1995; Rajan and Zingales, 2000).
8 Developed stock markets provide investors with better opportunities to diversify
risks, and thus lower risk premia charged for funding new projects. Developed stock markets
facilitate investment in high-risk, high-return projects (Morck and Nakamura, 1999; Weinstein
and Yafeh, 1998). These positive effects of stock markets are beyond dispute, but most others
are not. Some authors suggest that liquid stock markets increase the incentives to invest in
long-term projects (Levine, 1991, Bencivenga e.a., 1995) while other argue that liquid markets
create a myopic investment climate (Stein, 1988; Bhide, 1993). It has been argued that stock
markets quickly disseminate information and aggregate the investors’ valuations of firms’
performance, which greatly facilitates the efficiency of investment decisions, and that
developed stock markets facilitate disciplining of managers, by allowing to link managerial
compensation to stock price performance (e.g. Paul, 1992; Holmstrom and Tirole, 1993) and
facilitating the operation of the market for corporate control (e.g. Jensen, 1992). However, if
stock price at any given moment does not accurately reflect the value of the firm for
shareholders, investment decisions based on it may be suboptimal, linking managerial
compensation to stock prices may lead to suboptimal decisions, and hostile takeovers based on
such price will decrease rather than increase efficiency (Shleifer and Vishny, 1988; Shleifer
and Summers, 1988; Winter, 1990; Milgrom and Roberts, 1992). The evidence indicates that
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evidence of very large positive effects of the development of stock markets on
efficiency, which would have induced people to always prefer more development of
stock markets, despite the negative effects on certainty. A similar conclusion can be
drawn with respect to the impact of competition on efficiency. On the one hand it has
been argued that competition ensures that costs are minimized and the prices of
banking services are such that resources are allocated efficiently (Rhoades, 1982;
Gilbert, 1984; Frexias and Rochet, 1997). Increased competition can, however, have a
negative impact on efficiency, by preventing economies of scale to be realized, by
hindering investment in new technologies (to the extent monopoly power is
conductive to them), by giving lower-quality borrowers more opportunities to obtain
loans, by intensifying moral hazard problems in the relationship between lenders and
borrowers, and by facilitating excessive risk-taking (Allen and Gale, 2000). Finally, it
is possible that some degree of co-ordination of financial flows by the state can in
some circumstances facilitate economic development. The state can achieve such co-
ordination through selected financial intermediaries; competition among
intermediaries or from securities markets would make such co-ordination difficult if
not impossible.
This discussion suggests that politicians in societies that put a greater
emphasis on stability and certainty are more likely to adopt regulatory provisions
hampering the development of stock markets, both because stock markets lead to
greater instability and uncertainty on their own right and because they facilitate
competition in the financial system, which  further increases instability and
uncertainty for people.
This discussion also suggests that, even given the preferences regarding
uncertainty and stability, the overall effect on social welfare (or on the prospects of
                                                                                                               
the market does not aggregate all public and private knowledge (e.g. Seyhun, 1986; Malkiel,
1992), and, at least in relatively short run, even public information (as evidenced in ‘stock
market anomalies’; see e.g. Scherer, 1988; Shefrin and Statman, 1995; De Bondt and Thaler,
1995; Allen and Gale, 2000). Furthermore, it has been shown that equity markets may not
have advantages over intermediaries in aggregating information (Allen and Gale, 2000).
Developed stock markets reduce the effectiveness of another disciplining devise – shareholder
monitoring (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986; Bhide, 1993). Finally, to the extent the equity markets
are unstable, this may have a negative effect on economic efficiency (Crockett, 1996).
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political stability and re-election) of a particular type and level of deliberate co-
ordination in the financial system is extremely difficult to evaluate. In such a situation
political agents are likely to put a greater emphasize on those theoretical explanations
which correspond to their basic values and beliefs, which are largely shaped by
societal norms. Thus, in some countries most influential political agents may believe
that the best outcome is achieved by a system with as little deliberate coordination as
possible, while in other countries the best outcome may be believed to be produced by
a system which involves a significant degree of deliberate coordination.
The belief that financial system should be more competitive will induce
regulatory measures aimed at improving the conditions of competition. It also may
induce regulatory measures that increase the costs of such coordination among
financial institutions and between financial institutions and firms.
Finally, the aversion to concentration of economic power will induce stronger
protection of minority investors.
2.4.2 The state’s role in the provision of pensions
Whether pensions are provided by the state depends on the weight societies attach to
such values as stability of income, solidarity and avoiding social exclusion, equality,
reduction of poverty, and promoting autonomy (see Goodin et al. (1999) and
references therein). There are trade-offs between the various criteria, in particular,
between solidarity, on the one hand, and efficiency, autonomy, promoting self-
reliance and initiative, on the other. Thus, the society should decide on the relative
importance of each of these values. This decision is crucially influenced by deeply
rooted cultural values and has a crucial impact on the character of social welfare
systems, in particular the systems of pension provision (Rimlinger, 1971; Wilensky,
1974; Kluegel and Miyano, 1995; Becker, 1996). Societies that attach a high
importance to solidarity and equality are likely to favor a relatively great state
involvement in provision of pensions, while societies stressing autonomy and self
reliance are expected to prefer individual pensions schemes.9 Societies that are more
                                               
9 Thus, a strong emphasis on solidarity played a crucial role in establishing
solidaristic and universalistic welfare state in Sweden (Davidson, 1989), while emphasis on
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averse to uncertainty are likely to favor provision of pensions by the state, because –
at least in the short run- it is by far the most secure source of provision of pensions.10
2.5 Other influences
In the above discussion we did not consider the influence of ownership patterns on
stock market development. Stock markets are likely to be less developed in countries
with concentrated ownership, for the following reasons. Since a lesser fraction of
equity will be traded on the market, the stock price is likely to be more volatile
(Pagano, 1989a,b; Allen and Gale, 1994) and to aggregate the information about the
firm less effectively, making disciplining of managers through connecting the
managerial remuneration to the stock price more difficult (Holmstrom and Tirole,
1993). Shareholders will buy shares of such a firm at a discount compared to shares
of a similar firm with a large fraction of equity traded regularly. This reduces the
benefits of going public. Causation also may run in the opposite direction, however. It
is well known that prices of securities on thinner stock markets are more volatile,
more or less regardless of the share of equity of a particular firm which is traded.
Thus, in less developed stock markets the liquidity advantage for investors of the
dispersed ownership structure will be smaller, and disciplining of managers through
connecting the managerial remuneration to the stock price more difficult. Disciplining
through monitoring by large shareholders may be superior. Furthermore, in less
developed stock markets the probability of a hostile takeover because of mispricing
and not of underperformance of the firm is higher. Managers may want to guard
against this possibility. For these reasons the firms may choose to have a concentrated
ownership. Because it is unclear which direction of causality is predominant, in this
study we do not deal with the relevance of the concentration of ownership for the
level of development of stock markets.
                                                                                                               
individual achievement and individual responsibility for providing for living significantly
constrain the development of state welfare policies in the USA (Rimlinger, 1971; Wilensky,
1975; Coughlin, 1980; Tropman, 1981).
10 Thus, the proposals for introduction of funded pensions in Germany are “not
popular because of the perceived capital market risk. In particular, most workers find the
thought of putting a major part of retirement savings on the stock market rather frightening”
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Until now we have implicitly assumed that the size of a stock market is
determined by national factors. However, due to the increased liberalization of
international capital flows and national financial markets, one can question the
validity of this assumption and argue that the size is also or even to a great extent
determined by international factors. Although, we agree that in principle this is a valid
argument, we think that there are at least two reasons to believe that in practice
national factors are dominant. First we investigate the factors determining the
attractiveness of using the stock market for financing and investing. Foreign capital
will flow from countries with unfavorable conditions for using the stock market to
countries, which enhance the use of stock markets. In this sense international capital
flows strengthen our arguments.  Second, an important empirical fact is the strong
bias of portfolio holdings toward domestic securities (Tesar and Werner, 1995).
Although structural barriers to international investments have fallen, the observed
level of international diversification remains low (Rowland, 1999). Hence, it is likely
that the national factors dominate the international ones when determining the size of
stock markets.
2.6 The final scheme
The discussion in the previous sections highlights different channels by which cross-
country differences in preferences influence institutions and hence the performance of
stock markets. Figure 1 provides a summary of these channels. We identify four
major factors that can systematically differ across countries and are influenced by
preferences: (1) the regulatory environment; (2) the role of the state in provision of
pensions; (2) the attractiveness of buying shares, given the regulatory environment,
and (4) the attractiveness of issuing shares, in particular the benefits resulting for
owners/managers from the use of information contained in a share price by (present
and future) stakeholders. We related these factors to agents’ preferences. The attitude
towards uncertainty and instability appears to be of primary importance: it is relevant
for all four channels. A high level of uncertainty aversion is related to a skeptical
attitude towards capital markets and to institutions which are not conducive to the
                                                                                                               
(Börsch-Supan, 2001).
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development of these markets. So in a country where on average the population is
relatively uncertainty avoiding, the rights of minority shareholders are not well
protected, the state has a large stake in providing pensions, and the relationships
between firms and stakeholders are relatively close. Moreover, investors in these
countries prefer safer investments. The attitude towards competition and the attitude
towards concentration of economic power influence whether the regulatory
environment fosters the development of capital markets; the extent of solidarity with
the older generation is relevant for the role of the state in the provision of pensions,
and the managers’ valuation of independence is of importance for the closeness of the
relation between management and stakeholders. In the next section we investigate
whether and how cultural features of countries influence these preferences.
< insert Figure 1>
3 Influence of culture
As indicators of societies' cultural characteristics we use the cultural variables derived
by Hofstede (1980) on the basis of a survey of work-related values, which was
conducted in 1968-1973 and embraced about 120,000 native employees of IBM's
subsidiaries in 40 countries. The questions were designed to identify particular value
orientations of people. On the basis of the responses of people in each country,
societies were given scores on each question. Hofstede then factor-analyzed these
scores. He identified four dimensions on which national cultures differ. A country
could be given a score on each of the dimensions on the basis of scores on each of the
orientations which reflect this dimension. These national scores range from almost
zero to slightly more than 100. Many other studies on work-related values find the
same four dimensions (see Chinese Cultural Connection, 1987; Smith et al. 1994; and
Smith et al. 1996).11  Table 1 gives the scores for the countries considered in this
study.
                                               
11 One of them (the Chinese Cultural Connection) has identified an additional dimension:
Confucian Dynamism. It refers to the extent to which a society exhibits a pragmatic future-oriented
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For each of the four dimensions distinguished by Hofstede we briefly present
its main characteristics and relate these to the factors explaining stock market
development. In our explanation we often will present the orientations in a
dichotomous way to clarify the characteristics associated with the dimensions and the
expected relationship with other variables. The dimensions are, however, continua
and countries may lie at any point on it.
Femininity-Masculinity deals with the relative emphasis in society on caring
for others and quality of life on the one hand, and achievement and success on the
other. Feminine societies stress equality and solidarity and feel that the needy should
be helped; managers in these societies strive for consensus. Masculine societies stress
competition and feel that the strong should be supported; conflicts are resolved by
fighting them out; managers make decisions on their own.
From the different attitude towards competition between masculine and
feminine countries we conclude that in a masculine society the regulatory
environment is more likely to facilitate competition in the financial system. Hence,
the protection of shareholders’ rights is expected to be more strict in more masculine
societies. The inhabitants of feminine countries stress solidarity and equality and are
therefore likely to favour a comprehensive system of pension provision by the state.
In a masculine society managers are more reluctant to give up independence than
managers in a feminine society. Thus close relationships between firms and
stakeholders are more likely in a feminine than a masculine society. All three
channels in Figure 2 in which the dimensions Femininity/Masculinity plays a role
suggest that in more feminine countries the attitude and regulation is less in favor of
enhancing financial markets than in more masculine societies.
Uncertainty Avoidance (UA) refers to the extent to which people feel
threatened by uncertainty and ambiguity and try to avoid it and/or protect themselves
against it. People in societies high on Uncertainty Avoidance perceive uncertainty
                                                                                                               
or conventional and short-term perspective. The polar societal norms on this dimension are long-
term orientation and short-term orientation. This dimension is available for a few countries only and
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Table 1
Scores of countries on Hofstede’s cultural dimensions
Femininity Uncertainty
Avoidance
Power
Distance
Indivi-
dualism
Australia 39 51 36 90
Austria 21 70 11 55
Belgium 46 94 65 75
Canada 48 48 39 80
Denmark 82 23 18 74
Finland 74 59 33 63
France 57 86 68 71
Germany 33 65 35 67
Greece 65 112 60 57
Italy 30 75 50 76
Netherlands 86 53 38 80
New Zealand 42 49 22 79
Norway 92 50 31 69
Portugal 73 104 63 31
Spain 58 86 57 51
Sweden 95 29 31 71
Switzerland 30 58 34 68
United Kingdom 34 35 35 89
United States 38 46 40 91
Uncertainty Av. 0.131
Power Distance 0.063 0.762***
Individualism -0.233 -0.638*** -0.284
Source: Hofstede (1980). The Femininity score equals one hundred minus the
Masculinity score provided by Hofstede.
*** - significant at 1 percent level
inherent in life as a continuous threat that must be fought.12 Thus, they are motivated
by security more than by achievement for its own sake; in fact achievement is defined
in terms of security. People in these societies tend to reduce ambiguity. Conflict and
competition are felt undesirable. People in societies with a low Uncertainty
                                                                                                               
therefore is neglected in this study.
12 Uncertainty Avoidance is not the same as risk avoidance. See Hofstede (2001), p. 148.
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Avoidance accept uncertainty inherent in life much more easily. They are motivated
by achievement which is defined in terms of recognition by others (rather than
security). Conflict and competition are perceived as natural patterns of conduct,
which can be contained on the level of fair play and used constructively.
In high-UA societies investors will ask a higher uncertainty premium, which
reduces the price they are prepared to pay for shares. Hence, we expect a direct
negative relation between UA and the development of the stock market. The
association of low Uncertainty Avoidance with a positive attitude towards
competition suggests that there is a negative relation between UA and protection of
the rights of small shareholders. Since inhabitants of high-UA countries attach a high
value to security, we expect that in these countries the government’s role in the
provision of pensions will be higher. Entering a close relationship with the
counterpart is a way to reduce uncertainty. In a close relationship there are more
mechanisms for controlling the behavior of the other party (manager or shareholder).
Consequently, there is an “ideological preference for group decisions, consultative
management, against competition” (Hofstede, 2001, p. 160). The average duration of
employment with the same company is high (ibid, p. 169). In a high-UA society
stakeholders will require more collateral and a higher rate of return (respectively, will
give less trade credit), or more information and control, in arm’s-length than in close
relationships. Close relationships will thus be preferable to managers of firms from a
financial point of view. Hence, a positive relation between UA and the closeness of
the relationship between shareholders and firms can be expected. All this suggests
that higher Uncertainty Avoidance directly and indirectly has a negative impact on
stock market development.
Power Distance (PD) refers to the extent to which the society accepts that
power within its organizations and the society as a whole is distributed unequally.
People in societies with a large Power Distance believe that inequality is existential: a
majority of people perceives that there should be an order of inequality in which
everybody has a rightful place, and such an order provides the best protection for
everyone. People are a potential threat to one's power and rarely can be trusted;
cooperation is thus difficult to sustain. People in societies with a small Power
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Distance believe that hierarchy in society is an inequality of roles established for
convenience. People of different power levels feel less threatened and more prepared
to trust others and engage in cooperation with them.
High Power Distance is associated with less aversion to concentration of
power. Hence, we expect that the score on Power Distance is negatively correlated
with the provisions for protecting minority share holder rights, thereby negatively
influencing stock market capitalization (see Figure 2). In societies with a large Power
Distance agents are more reluctant to give up independence. They also expect more
opportunism from others and thus will be more reluctant to enter long-term
relationships. Thus, close relationships between a firm and a stakeholder are less
likely than in a society with small Power Distance, suggesting a positive impact of
Power Distance on capital market development. Consequently, the  values related to
this dimension influence stock market development in opposite directions. Given this,
we do not formulate nor test any hypothesis with respect to expected influence of the
country’s position on Power Distance.
Collectivism-Individualism reflects whether people look only after themselves
and their immediate family, or belong to in-groups which look after them in exchange
for loyalty. People in collectivist societies have a ‘We' consciousness; for them
collective interests prevail. In individualist societies people have an ‘I' consciousness;
for them individual interests prevail. Except for Portugal, all countries are quite
individualist. We therefore do not consider this dimension in this study. At the same
time, the countries differ significantly on the other three dimensions, which therefore
are considered in the following analysis. Of these dimensions the correlation between
Uncertainty Avoidance and Power Distance is relatively high and positive (bottom of
Table 1).
On the basis of this analysis we would expect stock markets to be more
developed in societies with lower Uncertainty Avoidance and in societies with higher
Masculinity. In addition to testing these two hypotheses, we can explicitly test the
relevance of two of the channels through which we expect culture to influence stock
market development, namely the protection of small shareholders’ rights and the role
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of the state in the provision of pensions. Hence the following five hypotheses can be
tested.
Hypothesis 1. The strength of legislative protection of minority shareholder is
positively related to the value of stock market capitalization relative to GDP.
Hypothesis 2. The ratio of publicly provided pensions to national income is negatively
related to the value of stock market capitalization relative to GDP.
Hypothesis 3. The strength of legislative protection of minority shareholders,
measured by the ‘antidirector rights' index, is negatively related to the level of
Uncertainty Avoidance and negatively related  to the level of   Femininity.
Hypothesis 4. The ratio of publicly provided pensions to the national income is
positively related to the level of Uncertainty Avoidance and positively related to the
level of   Femininity.
Hypothesis 5. The value of stock market capitalization relative to GDP is negatively
related to the level of Uncertainty Avoidance and negatively related to the level of
Femininity.
These hypotheses will be tested in the next section for 19 developed Western
countries listed in Tables 1 and 2.
4 Empirical Evidence
As the dependent variable we use for most countries the average of the stock market
capitalization (as a % of GDP) during the period 1976 – 1995. The data in Table 2
illustrate that the capital market capitalization is relatively high in the Anglo-Saxon
countries and Switzerland, whereas it is very low in Austria, Greece and Italy.
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Table 2
Stock market capitalization relative to GDP
United Kingdom 0.68 Sweden 0.32 Germany    0.17
Switzerland 0.64 Belgium 0.23 Norway 0.15
United States 0.55 Denmark 0.20 Italy 0.10
Canada 0.42 Finland 0.18 Greece 0.09
New Zealand 0.40 Spain 0.18 Portugal 0.07
Australia 0.39 France 0.17 Austria 0.06
Netherlands 0.36
The values are averages over the period of 1976-1995, except for Finland (1983-1995), New
Zealand (1985-1995), Norway (1981-1995), and Portugal (1978-1994).
Source: Calculated from the data in Demirguc-Kunt—Maksimovic database available from
the World Bank website.
The results of the regression13 testing the relevance of the two intermediate variables
for the relative stock market capitalization (Hypotheses 1 and 2) are reported in Table
3. We see that in both cases the relationships are indeed important empirically.14
When including both variables in the same regression, the coefficients of the variables
are not significant, while the variance explained is higher than in either of the
reported regressions. This is an obvious case of multicollinearity, which is to be
expected given the correlation of -.58 between the two variables.
                                               
13 The results presented result from estimation by means of Ordinary Least Squares.
Before estimating the relations we first have investigated whether there are influential observations,
which could lead to heteroscedasticity. Since this never appeared to be the case the Ordinary Least
Squares estimates are correct.
14 The relationship of the relative stock market capitalization with the ‘anti-director right’
index was identified for a sample of 45 countries by La Porta et al. (1998). The existence of the
relationship of capitalization and the ratio of publicly provided pensions to national income was
first mentioned by Roëll (1996) for developed European countries (although she does not report the
results of the regression).
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Table 3
Stock market capitalization and some explanatory variables: results of
regressions
Intercept 0.130**
(2.19)
0.622***
(5.11)
‘Anti-director’ rights index 7.060***
(3.66)
Ratio of public pensions to
national income in 1984
-3.176***
(-3.77)
Adjusted R2 .30 .26
t-statistics in parentheses. The superscripts *, **, *** indicate a significance level of 10,
5 and 1 percent respectively.
Source: Ratio of publicly provided pensions to the national income in 1984 : OECD
(1988). The data on New Zealand and Norway are not available for this variable.
Antidirector rights index: La Porte etc (1998) This variable has a range from 0 to 5
and is formed by adding 1 when: (1) shareholders are allowed cast a vote by mail (rather than
attend general meetings personally); (2) shareholders do not have to deposit their shares for
several days before and after the general meeting; (3) the minimum percentage of share capital
that entitles a shareholder to call an extraordinary shareholders' meeting is less or equal to 10
percent (the median of the sample, which ranges from 1 to 33 percent); (4) cumulative voting
for directors allowed; (5) there are legal mechanisms which can be used by minority
shareholders against a perceived oppression by directors (e.g., suing directors or the right to
force the company to purchase back the shares of shareholders who object to certain
fundamental changes).
Since according to Hypotheses 3 trough 5 two types of cultural dimensions are
suggested as explanatory variables, a question emerges whether these two factors will
interact in their influence. Would differences in Femininity, say, affect these
characteristics with the same force in high- and low-UA societies? It might be that the
effects of the two dimensions ‘cancel out’ to some extent. An interaction term (the
product of the two variables involved) is added to the regressions in order to test
whether this is the case.  The model thus has the form
ebbb +×++= FEMUAFEMUAy UFFU 00 , where UA and FEM are scores on
corresponding dimensions. This implies that the true coefficient of UA obtained from
the model is FEMUFUU bbb += 0 . The hypothesis that is tested in this case is:
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'Both bU0 and bUF do not significantly differ from zero'. The appropriate statistic is the
F-statistic for this joint hypothesis (and not the t-statistic for bU0). The same, of
course, is true for FEM. The value of t-statistic of bUF, on the other hand, reflects
whether there is indeed an interaction between the influence of the two independent
variables.
The results of testing of Hypotheses 3 and 4 are reported in columns 1 and 2
of Table 4. We see that all hypotheses are confirmed. Protection of minority
shareholders is weaker in more Uncertainty Avoiding countries. The state plays a
larger role in provision of public pensions in countries with a high score on
Uncertainty Avoidance and on Femininity. The results of testing Hypothesis 5 are
reported in column 3 of Table 4. We see that the hypothesis is confirmed. Stock
markets are more developed in countries with lower Uncertainty Avoidance and
higher Masculinity.15
It is possible that cultural characteristics influence the development of stock
markets only through one of the mechanisms we discussed. In this case the analysis of
relationships of financial systems with culture may be of limited interest. On the other
hand, if controlling for the influence of one mechanism, cultural indicators have a
direct link with stock market capitalization, this would indicate that other mechanisms
(including those for which no measurable intermediate variables are available) also
play an important role, and would underscore the importance of the cultural analysis.
The estimations, presented in columns 4 to 6 of Table 4, indicate that cultural
characteristics exercise influence on stock market development also through channels
other than, anti-director rights index and the ratio of publicly provided pensions.
                                               
15 We also run regressions that include Power Distance as an independent variable. In
regressions of antidirector rights index and public pensions, the coefficient of Power Distance is not
significant, confirming our expectations that values related to this dimension do not influence these
variables. In the regression of stock market capitalization the coefficient of Power Distance is
positive and significant at 10 percent level. This result is not robust, however. After excluding the
outlier  Austria, the coefficient of Power Distance becomes insignificant. The values and
significance levels of other coefficients are in all cases similar to those in the regressions not
including the Power Distance index.
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Table 4
Antidirector rights index, public pensions provision, relative stock
market capitalization and cultural characteristics: results of regressions
Antidirector
rights index
Public
pensions
Stock market capitalization
1 2 3 4 5 6
Intercept 8.936***
(4.84)
-12.433**
(-2.91)
1.308***
(4.89)
0.596*
(1.82)
1.190***
(5.18)
0.991***
(6.32)
UA score -10.874***
(-3.42)
0.422***
(5.46)
-1.469***
(-3.31)
-1.562*
(-1.94)
-0.912*
(-1.94)
-0.413***
(-3.95)
FEM score -7.69**
(-2.61)
0.307***
(6.84)
-1.199**
(-2.91)
-1.257*
(-2.03)
-0.762*
(-1.77)
-0.338**
(-2.24)
UA*FEM 13.226**
(2.43)
-0.597***
(-4.42)
1.675**
(2.26)
1.775*
(1.79)
0.822
(1.02)
‘Anti-director’
rights index
-0.706
(-0.16)
Pensions -1.797
(-1.60)
-2.509**
(-2.79)
F-stat. UA
[p-value]
10.28
[0.001]
16.76
[0.0002]
10.25
[0.001]
3.55
[0.057]
5.38
[0.018]
F-stat. FEM
[p-value]
3.76
[0.046]
9.76
[0.002]
5.20
[0.019]
3.75
[0.049]
3.51
[0.058]
Adjusted R2 0.47 0.65 0.52 0.49 0.55 0.56
t-statistics in parentheses. ‘F-stat. UA’ denotes the F-statistic for the test of the
hypothesis: ‘Both the coefficient of the UA score and of the interaction term
UA*FEM do not significantly differ from zero’. ‘F-stat. FEM’ has a similar meaning.
For source and definitions of the variables we refer to the notes to Tables 1, 2 and 3.
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5 Discussion
5.1 Stability of values
The argument of this paper is that a causal relation exists from culture to institutions
and economic organization to economic performance. There are three generally
accepted requirements for establishing a causality: there must be a statistical
association between two variables, the cause must temporally precede the effect, and
the association between the two variables should not be the result of a ‘third’ variable.
Hofstede’s cultural dimensions are based on the results of a survey undertaken in the
late 1960s, while our data on stock market capitalization refer to the 1980s and the
1990s. However, historical studies indicate that contemporary differences in stock
market development among countries have been formed decades ago (e.g. Rajan and
Zingales, 2000). The time order requirement therefore cannot be satisfied in a
conventional way. This situation often arises in social research. In such cases the
validity of causal relations is evaluated at the basis of relative fixity or alterability of
the variables: the suggested cause should be less alterable than the suggested effect
(e.g. Punch, 1998). The majority of sociologists agree that populations of nations hold
deeply rooted values which change very slowly, only within centuries. The question,
however, is whether values identified by Hofstede are such deep-rooted values.
There is considerable evidence that this is indeed the case and that cross-
country differences in values reflected by the dimensions (with a possible exception
of Individualism) have not changed significantly in at least the last century and a half,
and probably for much longer. Hofstede finds that Power Distance is positively
correlated with the size of the country concerned. Power Distance and Masculinity are
strongly related to geographical latitude and historical factors. In Europe, for
example, countries that long ago comprised the Roman Empire exhibit larger Power
Distance. The strong Femininity of Scandinavian countries can be traced to the
character of Viking societies when women had to manage the villages when men
were away on sea trips.
The differences in the level of Uncertainty Avoidance in developed countries
are closely related to the differences in the relationships between the individual, the
society, and the state, which have been relatively stable at least in the last century and
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a half. Societies differ in the locus of ultimate authority for collective action
(Jepperson, 1999). Collective purpose and authority may be located in a society at
large (so the state is considered as an instrument of society and has little independent
legitimization) or in a differentiated organizational center, (so “the state represents
and arrogates the public realm, while society represents a private sphere subject to
state tutelage'' (Jepperson, 1999, p. 9)). 16.  Jepperson (1999) thoroughly analyzes the
dominant political philosophies, ideologies and institutional arrangements of several
developed countries. He shows that these have not radically changed in the last
century and a half. It is remarkable that that in societies with a higher Uncertainty
Avoidance collective purpose is located in the society as a whole, while in societies
with higher Uncertainty Avoidance it is located in a differential organized centre.
This is quite understandable: social rationality and ‘tutelage’ relieve individuals from
the necessity of making choices in some very uncertain situations and provide
insurance against many unforeseen situations, thus reducing uncertainty.
Further evidence is provided by comparative analysis of law. The scholars
usually divide the legal systems by their origin (and some other characteristics) into
two broad legal traditions: Common Law and Civil Law. The philosophy of Common
Law stresses rights rather than duties, emancipation rather than control, responsibility
rather than paternalism. Common Law emphases the right of the individual to dispose
of himself and his property to the exclusion of every other interest. Civil Law, on the
other hand, stresses duty, authority and order. It tends to be paternalistic and often
‘protects individuals against themselves' – something that Common Law never does
(e.g. Chloros, 1978). The connection of these differences with basic distinguishing
characteristics of high-UA and low-UA societies is evident. And, indeed, societies
with Common Law score lower on the Uncertainty Avoidance index than societies
with Civil Law. The legal systems in question are formed by the beginning of the
nineteenth century (and the traditions on which they are based are several centuries
older), and their philosophy and fundamental legal provisions did not substantially
                                               
16 What is understood by such a centre may differ: it may be the state in the meaning
given to it in English, or Staat in the German sense, which refers to the organized political
community as a whole.
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change since then. This suggests that the same is very likely to be true for relative
levels of Uncertainty Avoidance in societies.
Summarizing, there are several arguments in favor of the proposition that
Power Distance, Masculinity and Uncertainty Avoidance are deeply rooted in the
Western societies and have been stable in Western countries over at least the last
century. This view is confirmed by Hofstede’s summary of empirical studies in this
field, which concludes that altogether data from 140 studies comparing from 5 to 39
countries were found to be significantly correlated with one or more of the
dimensions discussed above (Hofstede, 2001, p. xx).
5.2 Relationship with other explanations
Two explanations of the cross-country differences in stock market development have
been suggested in the previous literature. In this subsection we discuss how our
explanation is related to them.
La Porta e.a. (henceforth LLSV, 1998) argue that when investors are
protected from expropriation, they pay more for securities, making it more attractive
for entrepreneurs to issue these securities. They find that the differences in the
development of stock markets are significantly related to differences in legislative
protection of minority shareholders and in quality of enforcement of this legislation.
As mentioned in the Introduction, this approach has received substantial
criticisms in the literature. Roe (2000), in particular, argues that legal factors play an
important role in explaining differences in financial development between developed
and developing countries. But as long as the legislation enforcing basic property and
contract rights is in place and is enforced reasonably efficiently, differences in
specific measures of legal protection of minority shareholders are unlikely to play a
major role, since they can be compensated for by private means.
In the framework of our theory, both views can be accommodated. We allow
for the possibility that legal provisions may be an important determinant of the
development of capital markets. However, we suggest that these provisions are
shaped by more fundamental factors, in particular cultural values. At the same time,
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this is not the only, and perhaps not the major channel through which values influence
financial development.
LLSV (1998) also find that the strength of legislative protection of investors
and the extent of development of capital markets are related to origins of countries’
legal systems. In particular, common law countries provide investors with better
legislative protection, enforce these provisions better, and have more developed
capital markets than civil law countries. There has been some discussion on why this
is the case. LLSV (2000) suggest that political and historical differences between
mother countries shape their laws. They argue that in England in the seventeenth
century the crown lost control of the courts to parliaments dominated by property
owners, and common law evolved to protect the latter against the crown (this
protection was later expanded to investors). In France and Germany, on the other
hand, parliaments were weaker, commercial codes were adopted only in the
nineteenth century, and the state maintained political control over firms and did not
surrender its power of economic decisions to courts. In this interpretation, the
relationship of indicators of investor rights and financial development with legal
origins is found because legal origins correlate with the extent of state intervention in
the economy. The differences in the extent of state intervention will be largely
determined by cultural differences. Some arguments on how this occurs were made in
the previous section. We argue, however, that there are also other mechanisms
through which cultural factors influence financial development.
Pagano and Volpin (1999) build a theoretical model at which the political
process may lead to either high or low protection of investors. The authors assume
that disutility of work decline during the employment relationship, reflecting, in
particular, a growing attachment to work place. The process is more likely to result in
low investor protection (1) the stronger is the decline of disutility of work as the
employment relationship lasts longer; (2) the lower is the propensity of workers to
invest in shares rather than in other mediums; and (3) the higher is the propensity of
political groups (workers, entrepreneurs, and rentiers) to cooperate in the political
process. The authors do not investigate how these factors differ across countries. We
have argued in Section 3 that the former two factors will be influenced by cultural
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values related to Uncertainty Avoidance and Masculinity. It can be argued
theoretically and shown empirically that the propensity of employers and employees
to cooperate in the political process is also related to culture; in particular, it is higher
in societies with higher Uncertainty Avoidance, lower Masculinity and lower Power
Distance (Semenov, 2000). Our analysis thus suggests a possible explanation of why
particular countries arrive at particular outcomes predicted by Pagano and Volpin’s
model.
 It can easily be seen that out of the countries in our sample, the countries of
Scandinavian legal origin (Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden) differ from the
countries of other origins in their low Masculinity scores (the only country with a
similar score is the Netherlands). Among the other countries, all countries with
English legal origin (Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the UK, the USA) have lower
Uncertainty Avoidance scores than other countries, and among the latter all countries
with German legal origin (Austria, Germany, Switzerland) have lower Power
Distance scores than countries of the French legal origin (Belgium, France, Greece,
Italy, Portugal, Spain), except, again, the Netherlands. Only one country – The
Netherlands - has to be reclassified to make the correspondence perfect. Countries
with similar legal origins have similar scores on some of Hofstede’s dimensions,
scores that differ from countries of other legal origins17.
Rajan and Zingales (2000) note that extent of development of stock markets
in various countries changed greatly over time. Before the Great Depression, stock
markets in countries such as France and Germany were more developed than in Great
Britain or the USA. In most countries, the roots of the Great Depression were seen in
excessive investment by industry, excessive credit creation by banks, and excessive
speculation on the stock markets. These, in turn, were blamed on the unrestricted
competition in the 1920s. Politicians decided to restrain competition and reintroduce
stability in the industrial and financial sector. The government also wanted private
investments to go through the banking sector rather than through markets because
these flows could be more easily directed to preferred activities. In a number of
                                               
17 Similarly, a very strong relationship between legal origins and cultural characteristics
is observed when we consider the whole LLSV sample; see Semenov (2001).
This document is created usingPDFmail(Copyright RTE Software)
http://www.pdfmail.com
34
countries, measures were put in place restricting the ability of corporations to issue
securities in the market, and reducing the attractiveness of certain securities.
The major exceptions were Britain and its colonies and the United States. The
authors suggest that a major ‘reason for the resilience of financial markets in England
was the great importance of trade and cross-border financial flows to its national
output, and therefore the greater political power of traders and financiers relative to
industrialists. In the United States competition in the financial sector was not
restricted because of the inherent decentralization of the system, the checks and
balances existing in it. President Roosevelt clearly intended to intervene to restrain
the excess volatility in the product and financial markets. The US Supreme Court,
however, challenged the constitutionality of many crucial elements of  Roosevelt’s
program. Roosevelt’s fight against the Court made many influential figures anxious
about growing executive powers, and growing threats to property. This brought about
a conservative alliance, which ensured that Congress held up much of the New Deal
legislation. The authors mention that ‘the instinctive, almost ideological, American
fear of centralized power was also instrumental in the growing opposition to
Roosevelt’s plans’ (Rajan and Zingales, 2000, p. 34).
There is little doubt that political factors influence financial systems. Our
thesis, however, is that politics is influenced by culture. Cultural variables cannot
explain each particular political change. However, they can say something about the
direction of such changes. Before World War I and the Great Depression, politicians
in most countries believed in the necessity of adhering to the relentless logic of
competitive markets for economic success. This belief was stronger than any
reservations to such logic that could be contained in culture. As long as the economy
developed successfully, this situation persisted. However, this believe was shattered
by the Great Depression. The extent to which it was abandoned was determined by
cultural values, as were the new beliefs that replaced it. As we have argued, in
countries with high Uncertainty Avoidance or high Femininity these beliefs favor a
more reserved approach to markets, and in the former group of countries – also an
important role of stability in the economy. Cultural differences can thus explain why
the stance of politics has changed in the way it has. As we have seen, Rajan and
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Zingales utilize cultural factors (such as fear for centralized power) to account for the
developments in the USA.
5.3. Perspective on convergence
In this section we investigate the consequences of the results of our study for the
discussion on convergence mentioned in the Introduction. In order to do that we first
have to be more specific on what is meant by convergence. We speak of convergence
if we see a process that leads to more similar levels of stock market capitalization.
Indicators for such a process are: through time the standard deviation of figures on
national stock market capitalization (as a percentage of GDP) and the strength of the
relation between cultural values and stock market capitalization decrease.
Empirical evidence indicates that the standard deviation of national stock
market capitalization has increased significantly: from 0.21 in 1986 to 0.37 in 1996.
In every country except Canada the difference between its relative stock market
capitalization and the sample mean was larger in 1996 than in 1986. In all countries
with relative capitalization below the mean in 1986 relative capitalization increased
less than the mean increase in the sample, while in virtually all countries with relative
stock market capitalization above the mean in 1986 relative capitalization increased
more than the mean increase in the sample (the exceptions are Canada, New Zealand
and Sweden). There is thus little empirical evidence that the relative size of stock
markets is converging. The relative positions of countries also do not change much.
As mentioned in the Introduction, the correlation coefficient between the values of
relative stock market capitalization in 1986 and 1996 is 0.92.
This suggests that the influence of cultural differences on differences in stock
market has not decreased over this period. This can be tested more rigorously by
conducting regressions where the independent variable is the stock market
capitalization in 1986 and 1996. These results (not shown) are qualitatively similar to
the ones we report in Table 4, columns 3 through 6. The statistical significance of the
coefficients in the regressions of capitalization in 1986 and 1996 is very similar; the
values of all coefficients increase from 1986 to 1996 by a value very similar to the
ratio of standard deviations in the dependent variables in the two years (about 1.5).
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The variance explained, however, decreases slightly (from 0.58 to 0.52), indicating
that the role of other factors than cultural differences may have increased somewhat
in some countries. Overall, cross-country differences in absolute values of relative
stock market capitalization in this period have increased with relative positions of
most countries remaining similar, and these relative positions continue to be
significantly influenced by cultural dimensions. Hence, the results of this paper
reaffirm the position of those who argue that economic organizations are embedded in
deeper layers of society, which do not change vastly (see Section 5.1).  As a
consequence, provided no great external shocks occur, the relative importance of the
stock market changes only very gradually.
How likely is it that during the next decades external shocks or trends will
dominate the influence of cultural variables on the factors determining stock market
development? As we saw in the previous subsection, historically other factors played
an important role till the 1920-30s. It is in principle possible that the role of these
factors, relative to culture, will greatly increase, and to the extent they facilitate
convergence, it is possible that the level of development of stock markets will
converge.
One may argue that at least three external trends are occurring which might
appear to be of importance for the convergence of financial systems, namely: ageing
of the population, harmonization of economic legislation within the European Union,
and internationalization of product and financial markets. The first two trends are
relevant for, respectively, the role of the state in the provision of pensions and the
regulatory environment. Internationalization has been argued to lead to a convergence
of: (1) values, (2) regulatory environment, and (3) firm-shareholder relationships. It
may also alter relative costs and benefits of different forms of financing and
mechanisms of corporate governance. In accordance with our scheme that values
determine the other factors, we first discuss the possibility that internationalization
will lead to a convergence of values. Then follows an investigation of the possible
effects of these trends on the four factors found in Section 2: the regulatory
environment, the role of the state in providing pensions, the attractiveness of buying
shares (given the regulatory environment), and the closeness of the relationship
This document is created usingPDFmail(Copyright RTE Software)
http://www.pdfmail.com
37
between firms and stakeholders. Thereafter the implications of internationalization on
the relative costs and benefits of different forms of financing and mechanisms of
corporate governance are discussed.
It has been argued that an increase in interaction between people of different
cultures and in exposure of people of different nations to the same technologies may
lead to a convergence of values. This statement, however, is at variance with research
on the attitude of British and French students educated at INSEAD in France, of
Eurocrats in Brussels and of employees of multinational companies. The cross-
cultural interaction reminds the members of various countries of the “differences
between one set of cultural views and another, and this seems to lead to a slight
intensification of cultural traits” (Hampden-Turner and Trompenaars, 1993, p. 375).
Hofstede (2001) confirms this position and provides a wealth of evidence indicating
that differences between national cultures reflected in scores on dimensions have not
diminished since the end of 1960s and are unlikely to diminish in the future. Hofstede
concludes that “there is no reason they should not remain recognizable until at least
2100” (Hofstede, 2001, p. 36).
During the last decade in several OECD countries proposals have been put
forward to change the regulation in order to enhance the development of stock
markets, to increase the rights of small shareholders and to increase the transparency
of the corporate accounts. Often, special committees on the functioning of the
financial system made these proposals: the Bradford commission in the UK, the
Peters committee in The Netherlands, the Viénot commission in France. There have
been some changes in the regulation of some OECD countries that might enhance the
development of stock markets. However, the implementation of these
recommendations goes very slowly. In some cases new initiatives even seem to
counteract the proposals by these committees. In the Netherlands for example, the
SER (an advisory board) has proposed to increase the influence of employees on the
company’s boards, which is expected to hamper the influence of shareholders.  At the
European level it is even difficult to come to new legislation. After 12 years of
preparation the plans for a new directive establishing cross-border takeovers were
voted down by the European Parliament on July 4th 2001. It could take up to three
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years before the European Commission can present a new draft to the parliament (The
Economist, July 7th 2001). This directive aimed to ensure an adequate level of
protection of minority shareholders. At the end of the same month, the rights of these
minority shareholders were set at naught in the takeover of Telecom Italia by Pirelli
and the Benetton family. “A treatment which will kill the market” (The Economist,
August 4th, 2001). Hence, although, there are forces in continental Europe to improve
the rights of small shareholders, this process is slow and confronted with many
setbacks.
Due to the ageing of the population, the role of governments in providing
pensions is expected to decline in countries, where traditionally this role is relatively
large, such as many of the continental European countries. In this respect many
recommend to rely more on private pensions and funded pension schemes at the
expense of the pay-as-you-go schemes.18 This development should go hand-in-hand
with that of strengthening the financial market infrastructure, including the
establishment of a modern and effective regulatory framework (OECD, 2000, p. 8).
Some reforms in this direction have been made19. However, once again one can
observe great (very often emotional) resistance in many countries, which slows down
the speed of these reforms.
Given the regulatory environment, the attractiveness of investing in shares is
determined by the uncertainty aversion of investors. As we have argued before we do
not expect that the cross-country differences in values will change drastically.
Consequently we think that this will not contribute to a convergence of the
importance of the stock market.
It is difficult to establish with certainty whether there are trends to
convergence in relationships of firms with stakeholders. The evolution of investor-
firm relationships in the United States and Japan received much attention in the
literature and is likely to be indicative of general trends. It is well known that in the
                                               
18 This view is also held by those who foresee large transition problems and who are
skeptical about the advantages of fully funded systems; see Miles and Timmermann (1999) and
Boldrin et al (1999).
19 Information in this respect can been found on the webside of the OECD:
www.oecd.org
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1950-70s the Japanese financial system was characterized by close bank-firm
relationships and stable shareholdings, while the relationships of firms and investors
in the USA were arm's-length. In the 1980s, there were signs that the systems were
converging: there was anecdotal evidence that some of the largest Japanese firms
weakened their connections with main banks, and that a significant reduction of intra-
group shareholdings within the keiretsu was taking place. On the other hand, in the
USA some institutional investors began to take an active stance in corporate
governance. Many authors have expected a very significant convergence of the
systems. However, the evidence suggests that it has not happened. In the 1970-90s
Japanese companies increased the share of borrowing from the main bank; the
proportion of firms which changed their main bank decreased for medium-size firms;
the number of directors dispatched from city banks to other listed companies
increased by 34 percent from 1980 to 1993. Evidence of a survey by OECD shows
that corporations do not expect the demise of main bank relationships. Intra-group
shareholdings within the keiretsu decreased only slightly and remained significant.
Thus, there is little evidence of a decline in the importance of the main bank system,
keiretsu system, and the pattern of stable shareholdings (Corbett, 1998). With respect
to the United States, observers generally agree that while institutional investors' role
in corporate governance has been growing in recent years, only a minority of them
exercises such activism. It has not become a significant feature of American system
of corporate governance, and in most firms the relationship with all investors remains
at arm's-length.
Many authors suggest that internationalization of product markets puts
increasing competitive pressures on firms to obtain finance from the least expensive
sources and to adopt more efficient mechanisms of corporate governance. If these
sources are capital markets, and if these mechanisms are arm’s-length relationships
with investors and the market for corporate control, the development of both of which
is greatly facilitated by a developed stock market, then we may see a development of
stock markets in countries where they are thin to levels similar to those where they
are advanced.
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Underlying the convergence thesis is the assumption that there is, indeed, a
single most efficient mechanism of industrial finance. However, as we argued in
Section it is unclear that one system dominates the other. It is well known that any
arrangement has both advantages and disadvantages, and different arrangements may
be (approximately) equally efficient overall (e.g. Boyer, 1996; Shleifer and Vishny,
1997). More efficient financial arrangements may differ for different industries (e.g.
Porter, 1990; Allen, 1993; Soskice, 1996; Mayer, 1998). Thus, the end result may
very well be not a convergence of financial systems in different countries but
specialization of countries with particular financial systems in industries in which
these systems are more efficient.
Even if the best practice would exist, there are significant grounds to doubt
that the forces of internationalization are strong enough to induce convergence to it.
The share of exports in GDP remains quite small in all countries except some small
open economies, and has not increased significantly in the recent decades in most
countries. The level of international trade is still lower now in most countries than in
1913 (Wade, 1996). Similarly, all available indicators show that financial markets
were more integrated in the late nineteenth and the early twentieth century than ever
since (Zevin, 1992). Stock markets, however, remain far from being integrated.
Investment continues to be strongly constrained by domestic savings and cannot be
very easily financed from other countries' savings (Wade, 1996). The difference in the
price of borrowed funds remains substantial, and not very different from several
decades ago.
There are significant forces impeding convergence. First, in the opinion of
many researchers national production systems are rather tightly bundled packages of
specific national resources, institutions and legacies. This ‘tightness of fit’ makes it
extremely unlikely that any one practice or institution can be readily changed without
change in other aspects of the system (e.g. Streeck, 1991; Woolcock, 1996; Schmidt
and Tyrell, 1997; Hollingsworth, 1997). Second, in all industrial countries processes
of economic integration and globalization have generated an upsurge of reaction and
resistance in national politics. New political battles have broken out over whether
domestic institutions and practices in one's own society ought to be restructured to
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conform to institutions and patterns elsewhere (Berger, 1996). Third, and more
generally, any change in governance mechanisms is connected with costs of transition
of various kinds, which economic and political agents may be unwilling to accept.
We may conclude that some convergence does occur in two of the
mechanisms we have identified as mediating the influence of culture on stock market
development: the character of the regulatory environment and the role of the state in
the provision of pensions, and that these mechanisms in all countries increasingly take
the form more similar to that in countries with more developed stock markets. In both
cases, however, this process is connected with many setbacks and is not as far-
reaching as many have expected. Differences in the other mechanisms are unlikely to
diminish significantly without powerful external shocks. We thus expect that while
the levels of development of stock markets in different countries may converge
somewhat, significant differences among countries are likely to persist in the future.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we have related the cross-country differences of stock market
capitalization in OECD countries to national culture, where culture is the shared
norms and values in a society. By means of a theoretical investigation we have
derived the hypothesis that stock market capitalization is relatively high in countries
that score low on the index of Uncertainty Avoidance and high on the index of
Masculinity, two cultural dimensions found by Hofstede. Empirical evidence
confirms this hypothesis. This result reaffirms the position of those who argue that
economic organizations are embedded in deeper layers of the society. As a
consequence, provided no great external shocks occur, the cross-country differences
in importance of the stock market changes only gradually.
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Figure 1 The determinants of stock market development
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Figure 2 The hypotheses with respect to the determinants of stock market development
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Note: The figures between brackets refer to the hypotheses as these are formulated in the text.
Hypothesis 5 covers all arrows between Uncertainty Avoidance and Femininity on the one hand and stock market development on the
other.
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